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Abstract 
This paper presents a medium-long term analysis of the policy process in relation to tackling 
street homelessness in Scotland, through the Rough Sleepers Initiative. After setting the Scottish 
context in terms of governance and homelessness, the paper takes a chronological approach to 
policy review, drawing on empirical evaluative data and other documentary evidence. The paper 
then considers the overall effectiveness of the initiative in terms of its policy aims and in relation 
to the broader context of housing and welfare. The paper concludes by drawing some lessons 
which may have relevance beyond Scotland and the United Kingdom.   
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Tackling street homelessness in Scotland: 
The evolution and impact of the Rough Sleepers Initiative 
 Since the re-emergence of street homelessness in the United Kingdom (UK) at the end of 
the 1980s, successive UK governments have designed and implemented specific policies and 
strategies to tackle the problem. Within the UK, Scotland has always had the greatest degree of 
legal and political autonomy from the Westminster Parliament in London. Since the creation of 
the Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh, in 1999, law and policy in relation to housing and 
homelessness has been more or less fully devolved to the new Scottish government, the Scottish 
Executive.  
 This paper is concerned with a specific policy initiative designed to address the problem 
labeled as “rough sleeping” in the UK. This refers to those who have absolutely no shelter and 
are sleeping out of doors or in cars or other such locations. The terms rooflessness or street 
homelessness are also used to describe this, most acute, aspect of homelessness. In the UK, the 
term homelessness on its own has a broader meaning, incorporating those living in emergency or 
temporary accommodation, but lacking a secure home. The terms rough sleeping and rough 
sleeper have become embedded in UK policy and practice discourse on street homelessness. 
While this author does not consider these terms appropriate for describing those who experience 
street homelessness, their use in relation to policy initiatives cannot be avoided. 
The introduction, evaluation and review of the Rough Sleepers Initiative (RSI) in 
Scotland is documented, drawing on detailed empirical data from official evaluations and other 
published materials. The paper sets out the goals of the policy initiative, mechanisms for 
implementation and the range of assistance and services provided for homeless street people. 
From the available evidence it is possible to evaluate the initial effectiveness of the policy 
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initiative, together with the processes of review and fine-tuning, and to draw some broad 
conclusions on the medium-long term impact of the policy. 
There is a large body of literature on homelessness in the UK and helpful reviews exist 
(Burrows et al., 1997; Fitzpatrick et al., 2000; Hutson & Clapham, 1999; Kennet & Marsh, 
1999). There is a legal definition of homelessness in the UK (discussed below), but this paper 
draws on a common sense definition as summarized by Fitzpatrick et al. (2000). This definition 
includes both rooflessness and a range of temporary, insecure accommodation such as hostels 
and cheap bed and breakfast hotels.  
Beyond defining circumstances of homelessness, it is important to recognize that 
homelessness is part of the process of gaining (or not gaining) access to suitable, affordable 
accommodation and any support services required to live comfortably in that accommodation. 
The notions of pathways into, through, and out of homelessness have become increasingly 
acknowledged in the UK literature (Anderson & Christian, 2003; Clapham 2003). Quantification 
of homelessness is closely associated with definition and has remained a challenge for the UK 
policy community. Official UK homelessness statistics essentially monitor the flow of 
households through a bureaucratic process of applying for assistance from a local housing 
authority (e.g., Wilcox, 2002, provides useful summary tables). For many years, these official 
statistics largely excluded people sleeping rough. More recently, efforts have been made to 
improve estimates of street homelessness as discussed in relation to the different time periods 
below.  
The causes of homelessness have also been subject to intense debate in the UK, although 
there is an emerging consensus around the interaction between socio-structural causes (poverty, 
unemployment, the housing system) and more psychological explanations of individual agency 
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in terms of choices made within structural constraints (Anderson & Christian 2003; Clapham 
2003). Key risk factors associated with homelessness and trigger factors precipitating episodes 
of street homelessness have been identified by Fitzpatrick et al. (2000). Family background, 
experience with social work intervention and criminal justice systems, and physical or mental 
illness, often linked with alcohol and drug use, are all well established as being closely 
associated with acute homelessness. 
The UK also has a long tradition of government intervention in the housing system and in 
the development of policy on homelessness at the central government level. Hence, theories of 
policy analysis and models of the policy process (for example, Hogwood & Gunn, 1984; 
Parsons, 1995; Hill, 2005) have been applied to the analysis of homelessness interventions in the 
UK to a much greater extent than have psychological approaches. The policy process is mediated 
by political and ideological values of those in power, but, as this analysis will show, policy 
initiatives can survive changes in the political complexion of government. In the analysis below, 
four key periods for policy analysis are identified and reviewed in relation to the RSI and the 
changing political context and policy environment. Conclusions on the effectiveness of the RSI 
are then drawn, along with possible wider lessons for homelessness policy development beyond 
Scotland and the UK.  
The 1980s: The Roots of the Re-Emergence of Street Homelessness 
 Following the election of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1979, the 1980s was a 
decade of dramatic change in UK social policy. The Conservative administration implemented a 
program of welfare reform based on neo-liberal, free market principles and the rolling back of 
the welfare state, which had been built up since the end of World War II (Marsh & Rhodes, 
1992). For housing policy, this meant privatization of the public housing stock through sales to 
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tenants; reform of the management of rented housing; and substantial cuts in public expenditure 
on both the fabric of the housing stock and direct housing subsidies to tenants (see Anderson & 
Sim, 2000; Malpass & Means, 1993; Malpass & Murie, 1999).  
Legislation to protect certain households from homelessness had been introduced in the 
United Kingdom in 1977, prior to the Thatcher era. The law placed duties on local government 
housing authorities to assist certain households in the event of homelessness. An understanding 
of the operation of this key legislation, later consolidated in the Housing Acts of 1985 (England) 
and 1987 (Scotland) was crucial to any analysis of homelessness in the UK in this period. 
According to this legislation, a person or household was homeless if: 
they have no accommodation in England, Wales or Scotland, or have no accommodation 
which they are legally entitled to occupy. The accommodation must be reasonable and it 
must be reasonable for the household to continue to occupy the accommodation. A 
person or household is also homeless if they have accommodation but cannot secure 
entry to it; if occupation of the accommodation carries a threat of violence; or if the 
accommodation is of a mobile type and there is nowhere available to place and live in the 
accommodation (Anderson, 1994, p. 2, after Housing Act 1985, s58). 
 The legislation placed duties on local housing authorities to secure housing for 
households which met the following criteria: (a) were homeless according to the above 
definition, (b) contained a member in priority need, (c) had a local connection (residence, 
employment, family) with the local government area to which they applied, and (d) had not 
become homeless intentionally. Importantly, under criterion b, households deemed to be in 
priority need under this legislation included those containing: one or more dependent children, 
an expectant mother, or a vulnerable member (due to old age, physical or mental health, threat of 
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violence, or being young and at risk of financial or sexual exploitation). Essentially the 
legislation created a fundamental divide between priority and non-priority homeless households 
which pervaded subsequent policy, practice and analysis in relation to homelessness in the UK 
(Drake, 1989). In short, non-family households, not deemed vulnerable (mainly single people of 
working age) were only entitled to advice and assistance in the event of homelessness and for 
most of this period were effectively excluded from the homelessness safety net which would 
otherwise have given them access to the public housing sector (Anderson, 1994).  
Statistics on the number of homeless households presenting to local authorities and the 
action taken under the legislation have been recorded by local governments and published by the 
central government since the beginning of this period. Based on those presenting to local 
authorities, the recorded levels of homelessness in England doubled during the 1980s, from just 
over 60,000 households to around 127,000 (Greve, 1991; Wilcox, 2002). More significantly for 
this paper, the decade also ended with the re-emergence of street homelessness in the UK on a 
scale not previously known in modern times (Anderson, 1993). This increase in rooflessness 
was, initially, most visible in London: 
By 1990 it was claimed by voluntary agencies and accepted by the government that 
around 1,000 people were sleeping out in central London on any one night, but that there 
existed a floating population of 2,000-3,000 roofless people moving in and out of hostels 
and other types of temporary accommodation (Anderson, 1993, p. 22). 
While no official counts of street homelessness were available at the end of the 1980s, 
the best evidence of the increase was its sheer visibility, which drew a great deal of media 
attention at the time. The crisis was a function not only of pressures in the housing system, but 
also of broader retrenchment of welfare, and most particularly, specific cuts in social security 
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benefits which affected those most at risk of street homelessness (Anderson, 1993). However, 
the division between priority and non-priority homeless households was crucial in explaining 
why street homelessness, in particular, was almost exclusively experienced by single people 
(Anderson, 1993, 1997; Drake, 1989; Watson, 1986). Drake (1989) described the distinction in 
the homelessness legislation between priority and non-priority groups as a “fundamental 
definitional parameter which was central to any discussion of homelessness” (p. 120). That 
distinction continues largely to the present day, although this paper will demonstrate how 
improved consideration has been given to single homeless people over the long term and how, in 
Scotland especially, the recognition of their legitimate housing needs has gradually become more 
central to policy and practice. 
1990-1996: The Introduction of the Rough Sleepers Initiatives 
 The flow of households accepted by local authorities continued to increase and remained 
at a high level throughout the early-mid 1990s, for example reaching 149,000 households per 
year in England and nearly 20,000 households per year in Scotland (Wilcox, 2002). A 
prevalence measure of homelessness helps place these figures in perspective, relative to the 
general population. Around the same time, self-reporting in a nationally representative survey 
indicated that nearly 5% of the UK population reported having experienced homelessness at 
some point in their lives (Burrows, 1997). The 1991 census attempted to enumerate roofless 
people for the first time and recorded 2,703 people sleeping rough in England and Wales, 
although it was acknowledged that the methods employed were likely to have resulted in 
significant undercounting (OPCS, 1991). 
Despite continued adherence to free market economic and social policies, the 
Conservative government accepted the need to intervene to alleviate acute homelessness in 
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central London. Pressure for action came from housing advocates (such as Shelter, the campaign 
for homeless people) and the business community, who equally found the level of street 
homelessness unacceptable, although perhaps for different reasons (Anderson, 1993). During 
this period, the Westminster Government also commissioned a major study of the nature of 
single homelessness in England, including the first systematic survey of people sleeping rough 
(Anderson, Kemp & Quilgars, 1993). This study did not quantify single homelessness or 
rooflessness, but rather sought to understand the characteristics of homeless people and the 
reasons why they became and remained homeless. The findings from this study became available 
to policy makers during implementation of the first RSI in London, along with initial evaluation 
of the London initiative (Randall & Brown, 1993).  
Launched in 1990, the first Rough Sleepers Initiative (RSI) provided additional funding 
for a limited geographical area in central London where street homelessness was most evident. 
Not-for-profit organizations were charged with using the resources to provide additional 
accommodation and to manage the process of assisting people in moving from the street to some 
form of shelter. The 1990 RSI was envisaged as very much a short-term initiative to tackle what 
was thought to be a temporary crisis. However, successive reviews and evaluations resulted in 
the first RSI being extended to deal with an ongoing problem (Randall & Brown, 1993, 1995, 
1996). It must be noted, however, that for six years, the RSI provided resources exclusively to 
deal with street homelessness in a relatively tight geographical area of central London, despite 
increasing evidence of rooflessness across the rest of the UK. As implementation and review of 
the RSI in London proceeded, advocacy organizations lobbied for similar resources to tackle 
street homelessness in other parts of the UK, including Scotland. 
During 1990-1996, Scottish housing advocacy organizations consistently lobbied for the 
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extension of the RSI to Scotland, where, it was argued, similar problems of street homelessness 
could be readily identified (Shelter, 1996). During this period, homelessness in general was 
rising at least as rapidly in Scotland as in England (Wilcox, 2002). While the absolute number of 
homeless households is much higher in England, the total population is around ten times that of 
Scotland (National Statistics Online, 2002). In 1996, the recorded number of homeless 
households in England was 118,660, while in Scotland it was 17,200 (Wilcox, 2002). Hence the 
relative incidence of homelessness in Scotland is comparable to that of England, and at times 
more severe.   
Towards the end of this period, an RSI for Scotland was eventually announced by the 
Conservative government, just prior to its demise in the 1997 general election. However, this 
would not be a straightforward replica of the Central London initiative, but was adapted as 
considered appropriate for the Scottish context. In practice, little was achieved in terms of 
implementation in Scotland prior to the 1997 general election after which the Conservative 
government was replaced by New Labour. 
1997-1999: Political Change, but Policy Continuity for RSI 
 The election of a Labour government, led by Prime Minister Tony Blair, appeared to 
herald a new era in British social and economic policy. However, there would be no return to the 
left-wing social democracy to which the Labour Party had historically adhered. Rather, Blair and 
New Labour stood for a Third Way ideology between neo-liberalism and old-style social 
democracy based on limited state intervention in key policy areas and encouraging partnership 
between the state, the market, and the not-for-profit sector (Powell, 1999). In addition, a program 
of political devolution for Scotland and other parts of the UK was an early priority for the Blair 
government. However, during its initial phase of comprehensive policy and spending review, 
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New Labour adhered to public spending allocations set by the previous Conservative 
administration (Kemp, 1999).  
The European discourse on social exclusion (Room, 1995) quickly became dominant 
within New Labour dialogue, with the inclusion of all citizens through opportunity and 
participation an ultimate aspiration of government. Joining up both the policy agenda and service 
delivery in practice became a fundamental component of welfare reform for New Labour. In 
England, reviews of street homelessness and neighborhood renewal were undertaken by the 
Social Exclusion Unit, set up within Westminster Government in 1997. While housing policy per 
se had not been a high priority in New Labour’s election manifesto, the problems associated with 
social exclusion were seen to be located among those who were homeless or living on 
deteriorating public housing estates (Anderson, 2000). 
During 1997-1999 the Scottish Office continued with implementation of the Scottish RSI 
under the newly elected Labour government. The stated aim of the RSI in Scotland was to assess 
the extent of rough sleeping and implement proposals to address those needs (Yanetta, Third, & 
Anderson, 1999). There was also a medium term aim that by 2003 there would be no need for 
anyone in Scotland to sleep rough. Mirroring the earlier approach of the Conservatives in 
England, there was the expectation that the high level of street homelessness was some kind of 
temporary crisis which could be resolved by a short-term, intensive initiative. Nevertheless, the 
policy goals were backed up with significant financial resources: Initially, 16 million pounds 
(about $26 million) were allocated to the initiative in Scotland.  
In key aspects, the Scottish RSI was quite distinct from its English counterpart. First of 
all, it was a national (Scotland-wide) initiative from the outset (Scottish Office Development 
Department, 1996, 1997). However, local authorities were required to bid competitively to the 
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Scottish Office for a share in the pool of available funding. Second, local government housing 
authorities were explicitly given the lead responsibility in co-ordinating bids for resources, 
where they had been largely excluded from the earlier initiative in England. Arguably, the 
process of resource allocation was more transparent than had been the case in England. A 
Ministerial Advisory Group was constituted to appraise the bids and make recommendations to 
the relevant government Minister, for the allocation of funding. This advisory group was 
comprised of representatives of central and local government, housing and support agencies, 
non-government organizations and the professional body for housing workers, the Chartered 
Institute of Housing. It met to consider bids and make recommendations to the Minister for 
funding allocations, which were largely accepted without amendment, and produced its own 
interim review of the RSI (Rough Sleepers Advisory Group, 1999). 
The Scottish Office commissioned an early interim evaluation to run in tandem with the 
first year of implementation of the initiative, creating the opportunity to obtain early evaluative 
evidence that could inform later stages of implementation. Much of the remainder of this section 
considers the key findings from this evaluation. The evaluation sought to assess the development 
of local strategies for rough sleeping in Scotland, to assess individual projects and outcomes, to 
make recommendations on good practice for meeting the needs of rough sleepers, and to assess 
the effectiveness of the program overall. The evaluation used a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative research methods including focus groups with RSI staff and case study visits to all 
funded projects; analysis of RSI client monitoring data from funded projects; and an interview 
survey of 100 clients using services funded through RSI Scotland. The evaluation focused on the 
period April 1998-March 1999. During this period an initial 11 million pounds ($18 million) 
were allocated to 13 Scottish local authorities to provide accommodation and support services to 
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street homeless people, and, in some cases to conduct research and development work. 
While local authorities coordinated bids for their area, each bid could comprise either a 
single main project or a series of linked or discrete projects to help those sleeping rough in the 
locality. The approach in each area depended on the previous experience of tackling rough 
sleeping and the extent to which existing services were built upon, as opposed to starting from 
scratch. In all, 38 projects were funded across 13 (of a possible 32) local government areas. 
More than half of the total funding went to the two large cities of Glasgow and Edinburgh, where 
street homelessness was deemed to be most acute. Local authorities and partner agencies had 
considerable freedom in deciding what type of service best suited their area. 
Perhaps the most significant finding from the interim evaluation related to the sheer scale 
of rooflessness uncovered in Scotland (Table 1). The 25 projects working directly with roofless 
people saw some 3,619 clients across the year. To put this figure in perspective, in Glasgow 
City, the local authority had estimated around 50 rough sleepers through street counts, but over 
1,000 individuals used the RSI services in the first year. These statistics reflect the significant 
difference between attempts to physically count homeless people on the street on one night, 
compared to monitoring use of services over a period of time. Nonetheless, the interim 
evaluation confirmed that street counts on any given night underestimate the true scale of 
rooflessness, and also revealed a significant rooflessness problem across all participating areas, 
not just in the main cities of Glasgow and Edinburgh. 
Importantly, RSI services were found to be well-targeted to people who had been 
sleeping out and most clients had not previously been receiving help from other agencies (Table 
2). Thus, RSI did fill a gap in service provision. Very high levels of client satisfaction with the 
services provided were recorded, although service users may have had relatively modest 
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expectations, given that most had previously not been receiving any help. Some 80% of clients 
interviewed felt that the RSI services they used would help them to secure accommodation, and 
most acknowledged that they would need some support to get by in that accommodation. In 
common with earlier surveys of single homeless people, the interim evaluation of the Scottish 
RSI revealed that service users commonly reported having problems with drugs or alcohol, and 
other physical and mental health problems. A significant proportion had experience with social 
work intervention (including residential care) and with the criminal justice/prison system. While 
the client group presented many challenges in terms of resettling into ordinary accommodation, 
the survey also revealed that most service users had managed in their own home in the past. This 
was especially the case for older age groups. 
RSI project staff were generally positive about the initiative but were able to identify a 
number of barriers to achieving success in reducing rough sleeping (Yanetta, Third & Anderson, 
1999). Resource allocation was concentrated on funding support workers, as opposed to “bricks 
and mortar” accommodation and staff often had to negotiate with social housing managers 
regarding client referrals. Housing management practices with respect to rent arrears or other 
breaches of tenancy could also result in RSI clients being excluded from available 
accommodation, a conflict that needed to be addressed in mainstream practice over the long 
term.  
The interim evaluation concluded that the early impact of the RSI in Scotland was 
significant, particularly in terms of raising awareness of street homelessness and galvanizing the 
efforts of participating agencies. It should be noted, however, that a range of agencies funded by 
other means (e.g., charitable donations or local grants) were already in place to deliver some 
services, notably in Glasgow and Edinburgh. While networks developed to co-ordinate the work 
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across RSI funded projects, these did not necessarily embrace the work of these pre-existing 
organizations. Nevertheless, RSI represented a significant enhancement to service provision and 
appeared to be a catalyst for improved discussion and joint working between agencies. In terms 
of policy recommendations, the findings of the interim evaluation indicated that RSI needed to 
continue, at least in the short-medium term. Early implementation had highlighted a more severe 
problem than had been appreciated and had identified key gaps in service provision for roofless 
people. The evaluation recommended that all local government authorities should be required to 
assess the scale of rooflessness within their localities and to develop an appropriate range of 
accommodation services. Further, practices on rent arrears, leasing agreements, support and 
eviction needed to be examined, with a view to finding ways to accommodate clients with 
difficult tenancy histories and difficult behavior. 
The interim evaluation also revealed that RSI had been largely focused on housing and 
funded through housing budgets. There remained a need for a more co-ordinated approach from 
the central government level through to front-line service delivery and for increased input and 
financial resources from social work, health and criminal justice services in acknowledgment of 
their responsibilities to this client group. For the long term, it was evident that policy and 
practice needed to move from intervention to prevention, if the initiative was to have an enduring 
impact. Moreover, explicit recognition of the legitimate housing and welfare needs of single 
homeless people should underpin the provision of adequate resources for housing and support as 
part of mainstream welfare provision. Such a change in the approach to tackling street 
homelessness would acknowledge the need to tackle the underlying structural causes of 
homelessness that the RSI could not effectively address. That is to say, the RSI was better at 
dealing with crisis intervention and offering support than alleviating poverty or, say, facilitating 
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re-engagement with the labor market. 
Overall, during this short period of two years, significant progress was made with 
implementation of the Scottish RSI, combined with initial evaluation and review. During the 
same period, legislation was passed to facilitate more fully devolved government in Scotland, 
heralding yet another new phase in governance and policy development which was to result in an 
even more fundamental review of homelessness policy, beyond tackling rough sleeping. 
2000-2005: Devolution, Further Evaluation of RSI and Wider Review  
 Following the first elections to the newly established Scottish Parliament, a coalition 
between New Labour and the Liberal Democrat party formed the first devolved Scottish 
Government in almost 300 years. Traditionally the Liberal Democrats had been the UK’s third 
and more centrist political party. Arguably, however, realignments have led to the Liberal 
Democrats taking an increasingly left-of-center stance in comparison to New Labour’s clearly 
centrist Third Way.  
In this new political context, implementation of a revised, more sophisticated, RSI 
continued to provide accommodation and support services for street homeless people, drawing 
on the earlier experience and the findings of the interim evaluation. For example, the second 
stage of the Scottish RSI provided specific funding for housing advice workers in Scottish 
prisons to improve discharge protocols. Importantly, resources continued to flow into the 
initiative and total funds allocated amounted to more than 40 million pounds by October 2003 
(Shelter, 2003), more than three times the first funding level provided in 1998-99. The Scottish 
RSI had continued to evolve but was scheduled to be officially terminated by the end of March 
2003, with the expectation that the accommodation and services it had provided would continue 
as part of mainstream local housing and support service provision. 
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The Scottish Executive commissioned further research to monitor whether it was meeting 
its target of eradicating the need to sleep rough in Scotland (Laird, 2003). By 2001-2002, 28 
local authorities were participating in RSI and monitoring data were obtained directly from local 
projects. Figures were recorded over a snapshot week (including the number of rough sleepers 
and the number of unfilled bed spaces in temporary accommodation). The count was undertaken 
twice yearly. The total number recorded as sleeping rough showed a marked decline over three 
waves, although it appeared to be leveling out in 2002 (Laird, 2003). Also in 2001-02, 80% of 
recorded rough sleepers were male, mostly 25-40 years old and 69% were recorded in the four 
largest local authorities, mainly in Edinburgh and Glasgow (Laird, 2003). There remained some 
evidence of long periods of rough sleeping, but this appeared to be decreasing. Challenges in 
meeting the target continued to arise from combinations of problems such as drugs and alcohol 
and more could still be done on joint working (Laird, 2003).  
After the official end date for the initiative (March 2003), the Scottish Executive 
continued to fund services through local authorities, though no longer formally as RSI (Shelter, 
2003). At the end of 2003, the Scottish Executive announced the latest available figures for street 
homelessness in Scotland as part of an official statement on the impact of the initiative (Scottish 
Executive, 2003). By October 2003, only 328 people were recorded as sleeping rough, compared 
to 500 in May 2001. The Scottish Communities Minister commented that the target of ending the 
need to sleep rough had only just been missed. Overall, the reduction in street homelessness was 
considered to be an exceptional achievement (Scottish Executive, 2003). In a separate statement, 
the achievements of the RSI were also commended by advocacy agencies and participating 
service providers (Shelter, 2003). While rough sleeping had not been eradicated, it had certainly 
been reduced and without the initiative, street homelessness in Scotland would be much higher.  
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While accepting the official statistics and the achievements of RSI, the agency statement 
(Shelter, 2003) was more cautious in its overall assessment. For example, the Scottish Executive 
was criticized for taking too simplistic an approach to crude numbers of rough sleepers 
compared to empty beds in hostels. Indeed, meeting needs is much more complex than a simple 
numbers equivalence. Moreover, the target of ending the need to sleep rough was also seen as 
too simplistic, though important in driving political commitment (Shelter, 2003). Viewed from 
the agency perspective, a key achievement was the greatly improved understanding of the 
complex nature of rough sleeping and the types of services required to meet client needs. A 
particular concern was that those still on the streets may be those in greatest need of assistance. 
Given the scale of resources devoted to the RSI Scotland since 1996, provider agencies were at 
pains to stress the need for continued investment to avoid any subsequent reversal of what had 
been achieved (Shelter, 2003). National and local government needed to ensure that the 
momentum built up was sustained and that resources continued to be directed to those vulnerable 
to street homelessness. 
The RSI in Scotland did not continue in a policy vacuum. Indeed, an early priority for the 
Scottish Parliament was a comprehensive review of housing policy. As part of this process, a 
Homelessness Task Force (HTF) was set up in August 1999 to conduct a major review of 
homelessness legislation and practice (Homelessness Task Force, 2002a). An interim report was 
published in April 2000, in order that early recommendations could feed into the legislative 
process (Homelessness Task Force, 2000). The subsequent Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 placed 
new duties on local government to develop comprehensive local homelessness strategies, 
including addressing rough sleeping. Existing duties to provide assistance to homeless 
households were also extended to include the provision of temporary accommodation for those 
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not considered part of a priority need group. Previously, such households had no clear 
entitlement to help beyond general advice and assistance.  
The final report was published by the Scottish Executive in February 2002 (HTF, 2002a). 
The HTF also commissioned a substantial program of research to inform its deliberations (HTF, 
2002b). In principle, the Minister for Social Justice accepted all of its recommendations, which 
effectively represented a broad consensus across statutory and non-statutory agencies. The key 
recommendations were translated into policy through The Homelessness (Scotland) Act 2003, 
amending the earlier 1987 and 2001 Acts (Chartered Institute of Housing (Scotland), 2003). The 
Act extended the categories of priority groups and made provision for the gradual abolition of 
the priority/non-priority need group divide. It also introduced a duty to provide temporary 
accommodation and appropriate support for intentionally homeless households. Overall, the Act 
resulted in a further increase in eligibility for social housing for roofless people.  
In England, during this period, the government also set a target to reduce the number of 
people sleeping rough by two thirds, or as near as possible to zero, by 2002. A specialist Rough 
Sleepers Unit (RSU) was to implement the recommendations and to develop a national policy on 
rough sleeping for England (Rough Sleepers Unit, 2001). Subsequently, an independent study 
confirmed that the RSU had achieved its target by November 2001 (Randall & Brown, 2002). 
However, it was concluded that there would be a continuing need for services, though possibly 
on a reduced scale.  
On the whole, important progress continued to be made in reducing rough sleeping in 
both Scotland and England during this period. However, by 2001 the absolute number of 
recorded rough sleepers in Scotland (500) remained close to that of England (703), despite 
having only one tenth the population (Department for Work and Pensions, 2003, T15a). 
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Research evidence offers little by way of explicit explanation of the relatively high incidence of 
rooflessness in Scotland, compared to England. However, trends in homelessness in Scotland 
have tended to lag behind those in England (Wilcox, 2002), the RSI was launched much later in 
Scotland, and the overall economy of Scotland is generally poorer than that of England. 
Moreover, long-term, overall rates of homelessness have remained high or continued to increase 
(Wilcox, 2002), suggesting that the emphasis on reducing street homelessness was paralleled by 
an increase in other types of homelessness, such as inadequate temporary accommodation. 
Some time after the official “termination” of the RSI in Scotland, the Scottish Executive 
published its final, retrospective evaluation (Fitzpatrick et al, 2005). One of the aims of the 2005 
study (p. 9) was to consider to what extent the recommendations of the interim evaluation 
(Yanetta et al, 1999) had been taken on board. The final evaluation confirmed that RSI had 
produced tangible reductions in rough sleeping, but that new individuals still continued to 
experience street homelessness. Local housing authorities reported cumulative benefits resulting 
from the combination of RSI and broader policy initiatives such as the implementation of 
homelessness strategies, health and homelessness action plans, and a new program (Supporting 
People) for funding support services for vulnerable people, including rough sleepers. Continuing 
difficulties related to helping those with multiple needs and ongoing shortages of key services 
such as drug rehabilitation, as well as a shortage of suitable long term housing options for those 
still sleeping rough (Fitzpatrick et al, 2005). 
Conclusion 
 Though subject to much review and revision, the Scottish RSI survived Conservative, 
Labour and Coalition (Labour/Liberal Democrat) governments. The question may be posed as to 
whether this longevity in policy implementation indicates the convergence of political ideologies 
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and the emergence of political consensus with respect to the homelessness problem? Or rather, 
does the evidence point to the conclusion that the resolution of street homelessness continues to 
elude political parties of all ideological persuasions?  
In this final section, the analysis draws on all of the available evidence to assess the 
longer-term impact of the Scottish RSI. The critique has demonstrated both the significance and 
the limitations of this high profile policy initiative. From the evidence examined, it can be 
concluded that significant progress has been made in tackling street homelessness in Scotland, 
but that there remains a need for service provision over the long term. There were some 
important differences in the evolution of the RSI between Scotland and England. However, both 
produced similar strategies which included targets for reducing the number of people sleeping 
rough and some special initiatives, for example on supporting people leaving prison and the 
armed forces. 
The process of policy analysis also reveals some questions and lessons on homelessness 
which are likely to have relevance beyond Scotland and the UK. For example, street 
homelessness presents an important policy case study on progress in collaborative working, as 
the need for joined up solutions has became increasingly evident. There is a broad consensus, 
certainly within British social policy, that acute homelessness is a multifaceted issue, not just a 
housing problem. This has led to an emphasis on holistic solutions and multi-agency working, 
with an increasing variety of practical responses. These ideas of collaborative, joined up working 
also seem to transcend political divisions and international boundaries (Anderson, 2003).  
The complexity of the issues means that the provision of housing alone is unlikely to 
fully resolve homelessness in the long term. Housing providers do need to work with other 
service providers to ensure delivery of appropriate support services to help people get by in 
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transitional or long term accommodation. Most recently, the development of broader 
homelessness strategies can be seen in the UK and, for example in Australia (Anderson, 2003). 
Collaboration and strategic approaches may be necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for 
development of effective policy and practice. Eventual outcomes will always reflect broader 
issues relating to the overall welfare settlement in any country and the balance of priorities 
across different client groups. Equally, strategies are dependent on implementation—the most 
challenging element of the policy process for both service delivery and evaluation.  
Another important issue emerging from the RSI is around consensus politics and the 
policy process. The constitution of Advisory Groups with many relevant stakeholders involved 
has been key to policy development in Scotland and other parts of the UK. However, we must 
also ask whether it then becomes more difficult for partnership agencies to express criticism or 
opposition, or to expose evident weaknesses in strategy or implementation. It remains difficult to 
systematically research this part of the policy process, but it is important to understand the ways 
in which individuals, at different tiers, in different organizations, with very different degrees of 
power, actually come together to agree on collaboration in practice.  
Despite, or possibly related to, the complexity of the process, homelessness policy and 
strategy has also remained heavily “top down” in nature, with the agenda largely set by central 
governments and some key agencies, then filtering down to front-line service providers. While 
there is some evidence of improved empowerment and participation of homeless people in the 
process (Velasco, 2001) this remains a marginalized dimension of the policy jigsaw.  
Looking at international comparisons, there may well be other policy transfer lessons 
from the experience of the RSI. The RSI has been accepted and implemented by parties 
representing different political ideologies and may indicate either some degree of consensus on 
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homelessness, or, the existence of a structural level of homelessness in advanced capitalist 
societies which will always necessitate some intervention. Despite differing structures for 
housing and welfare provision, the same types of people seem to be at risk in the advanced 
capitalist societies of Australasia, Europe and North America (Anderson, 2003). While structural 
forces relating to poverty and the housing and labor markets underpin homelessness across 
countries, street homelessness is also persistently associated with a range of individualized 
disrupted life circumstances, from family breakdown to severe abuse and dependency on alcohol 
and/or drugs. At the international level, there has been a fruitful debate on the concept of welfare 
state regimes following the work of Esping-Andersen (1990). Homelessness research has not yet 
been fully integrated into these debates although the Europe-wide work of Edgar et al (2002) 
does begin to take this agenda forward. Nevertheless, to date there have been few truly 
comparative empirical studies of homelessness and there remains a need for more longitudinal 
analysis both nationally and internationally (Anderson, 2003). 
In a broader review of international research on homelessness, Anderson (2003) 
challenges the research and policy communities to deliver greater rigor in policy evaluation. 
However, researchers also face constraints in the policy process. For example, where 
government funds evaluation of its own policy initiatives, it will have significant control over the 
timing of the evaluation and the resources available, if not the actual content. Pleace and 
Quilgars (2003) have also issued a strong challenge to governments and researchers regarding 
the effectiveness of many UK policy evaluation studies. They argue that too few achieve even a 
two-year evaluation period or generate repeated, comparable evaluations. There have been a 
series of detailed evaluations of the English RSI over what is now a ten-year period (Randall & 
Brown, 1993, 1995, 1996, 2002). There has also been ongoing monitoring of the Scottish RSI 
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(Yanetta et al, 1999; Laird, 2003; Scottish Executive, 2003; Fitzpatrick et al, 2005) allowing 
comparisons between interim and final evaluations.   
Sound long-term policy evaluation often suffers from a lack of sound planning for 
evaluation. For example, where policy leads analysis and funding restrictions apply there may 
also be data collection constraints. Once an initiative is operational, recording systems may have 
developed which do not match with the requirements of independent evaluation. In terms of 
timing, evaluations may be too early and too short to fully assess the impact of a particular 
initiative. However, the Scottish RSI is one example where a reasonable assessment can be made 
of the medium-long term impact of policy. Overall, the conclusion must be that there has been a 
degree of success but that there remain fundamental inequalities in the housing and welfare 
systems, which mean that rough sleeping has not been eliminated. Rigorous long-term policy 
analysis undoubtedly requires substantial resources. While this may raise a conflict with 
resources allocated for policy implementation and service provision, in the long run it may be 
money well spent if effective policy interventions are an outcome.  
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Table 1: Key findings: National statistical monitoring 
• 25 participating projects worked with 3,619 clients during 12 months 
• Nearly a third of clients used services outside the main cities of Glasgow and 
Edinburgh 
• More than half were aged 26-59 years, with 42% under 26 and just 4% over 
60 
• Key issues faced by clients included problems with drugs and/or alcohol; 
physical and mental health problems; previous experience of prison and social 
work intervention. 
• Nearly all clients were sleeping rough or in similarly vulnerable housing 
circumstances when they first contacted services 
Source: RSI Interim Evaluation (1999), N = 3,619 
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Table 2: Key findings: Client survey 
• 85% had recently slept rough  
• More than half had not been getting help from any other services before 
• The majority previously had their own home (94% for those aged over 35 
years) 
• More than a third had been banned from some hostels or services (more 
than half in Glasgow) 
• Two thirds had experience of social work care, armed forces or prison 
• 86% had been living in the same area for a year or more 
• 80% thought RSI services would help them get the accommodation they 
wanted 
• 80% thought they would need support in their preferred accommodation 
• 97% would recommend RSI services to other rough sleepers 
Source: RSI Interim Evaluation (1999), N = 100 
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